The Israeli ultra-orthodox population doubles every seventeen years. With 60% of prime aged males attending yeshiva rather than working, that community is rapidly outgrowing its resources. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize yeshiva attendance, yet attendance typically continues long after the attendants are draft exempt. I explain this puzzle with a club good model in which yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community. Subsidizing membership in a club with sacrifice as an entry requirement induces increased sacrifice, compounding the distortion and dissipating the subsidy. Policies treating members and potential entrants equally are Pareto improving. The analysis may generalize to other 'fundamentalist' groups that respond to the incursion of markets by increasing the stringency of prohibitions and sacrifice.
model in which members benefit from the religious and social activity of other members within the club. Religious prohibitions can be understood as an extreme tax on secular activity outside the club, which substitutes for activity within the club. A religious community lacking authority to tax, or unable to subsidize unobservable religious activity, may choose prohibitions to increase religious activity among members. Sabbath observance and dietary restrictions, for instance, can be rationalized with that approach.
Rationalizing the one-time destruction of resources, such as a burnt offering, public vows of celibacy, or abstinence takes more effort. For that Iannaccone augments the model with heterogeneous agents who signal their commitment to the religious club by incurring costs or 'sacrificing', allowing the club to exclude free riders, choosing only the most committed among potential entrants. This approach to religious behavior as a social activity does not dispute the importance of faith, but attempts to provide a positive theory orthogonal to an explanation based on faith. Glaeser and Glendon (1997) provide some evidence supporting this approach, showing that church attendance in the U.S. is predicted by the attendance rate of people with similar educational levels in the same area.
I extend Iannaccone's model and apply it to the study of Israel's ultra-orthodox Jews, a fascinating and fast-growing group, which has held virtual veto power over public policy in Israel for the past twenty years. The Israeli ultra-orthodox are threatened by economic crisis (Dahan, 1996; Berman and Klinov, 1997) . I document four components of that impending problem: (i) low labor force participation rates by prime-aged males, 60% of whom are in a yeshiva (a religious school with no secular training component; plural: yeshivot); (ii) low market wages for yeshiva graduates; (iii) low current incomes of families; (iv) annual population growth rates of 4-4.5%, which imply a community doubling in size every 16-18 years, and rapidly outgrowing its resources.
In the face of poverty among their families, why do men remain in yeshiva? Part of the explanation may be the draft deferment, which effectively subsidizes yeshiva attendance. But we also observe yeshiva attendance by men in their forties, long after the deferment subsidy has run out. Could the explanation simply be a pious devotion to studying the holy scriptures? That seems unlikely, since ultra-orthodox men outside Israel, even followers of the same streams, are rarely full-time yeshiva attendants beyond age 25.
I offer an explanation based on the club good model, 5 in which yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the ultra-orthodox community, or club. This model clarifies the inefficiency in the draft deferment system and other subsidies enjoyed by community members, such as stipends provided to yeshiva students. Intuitively, subsidizing a signal is inherently wasteful as it destroys signaling value, inducing a more costly signal. More generally, subsidizing any aspect of membership in a club that has a costly signal as an entry requirement induces a more expensive signal which dissipates the initial subsidy.
It may be the ultimate in distortionary public policy. Equity and efficiency are aligned in this case, as a subsidy that does not favor membership for the potential entrant will not induce an inefficient increase in the signal. Equitable, Pareto-improving subsidies are possible.
Sociologists explain ultra-orthodoxy as the reaction of a cohesive, mutually supportive community to the external threat of emancipation. In the model emancipation is expressed as rising real wages, which threaten to lure away the members most valuable to the community's mutual insurance system. The incursion of market forces into traditional societies is a drama which European Jews experienced beginning centuries ago and which continues today in Israel. That process is common to traditional societies throughout the world, either historically or currently. I speculate on the generality of this approach in the analysis of fundamentalist societies in the conclusions.
Section II provides background on the Israeli ultra-orthodox community, describing its rapid population growth and growing welfare dependence. Section III develops the model. Section IV discusses the model's implications for policy. 5 See Cornes and Sandler (1986) for a clear explication of club good theory.
II. Background: Jewish Ultra-Orthodoxy
Ultra-orthodox Judaism is a highly ritualized form of observance about two centuries old. 6 Its spread dates back to the beginnings of European Jewish assimilation into secular society at the end of the 18th century. Ultra-orthodox Jews today practice a tradition that preserves to a remarkable degree the lifestyle of their villages or shtettls of Eastern Europe in the last century. The men are bearded, wearing long black formal overcoats with black wide-brimmed hats. The women dress modestly, with only faces and hands visible, the hair of married women covered by wigs. Prohibitions which Jews had traditionally observed, such as dietary restrictions and sexual propriety, are augmented by the ultra-orthodox. For example, unlike orthodox Jews, some ultraorthodox refuse to use a delineated area (eruv), which allows one to carry objects on the Sabbath, geographically limiting the size of a synagogue community. Moreover, many traditions in use of language, diet, clothing and synagogue practice have been elevated to the status of religious imperatives among the ultra-orthodox, and deviations can result in social ostracism. Thus, the customs of 19th century Eastern European Jewry are currently preserved quite precisely in New York and Israel.
Yet despite the conservative appearance of the culture, Jewish ultra-orthodoxy is radically more stringent in its demands than pre-modern European Jewry, and less tolerant of deviation. 7 One aspect of this increased stringency of dietary and other laws is the segregationist nature of ultra-orthodoxy, which broke with a long-standing tradition of unity within Jewish communities. By making it difficult to eat with, and unacceptable to worship with Reform or even Orthodox Jews, including relatives, the 6 The origins of Jewish ultra-orthodoxy are well described in Friedman (1991 ), Heilman (1992 and Katz (1961) . 7 "Of all the branches of modern-day Judaism, ultra-Orthodoxy is undoubtedly the most tradition-oriented. Its rallying cry is "All innovation is prohibited by the Torah!" a clever wordplay on a Talmudic ruling first coined by Rabbi Moses Sofer in the early nineteenth century that captures the essence of its conservative ideology. And yet, like other antimodern conservative movements, ultra-Orthodoxy is clearly a recent phenomenon. Belying the conventional wisdom of both its adherents and its opponents, it is in fact not an unchanged and unchanging remnant of pre-modern, traditional Jewish society, but as much a child of modernity as any of its 'modern' Ultra-Orthodox consciously reduced social contact between the ultra-orthodox minority and the rest of the Jewish community.
The degree of mutual insurance practiced within these communities today is reminiscent of a traditional Indian village (Townsend, 1994) , and believed to be unprecedented in Jewish history. 8 Charity is common and free loans abound, both in money and in kind (Landau, 1993) . No sick member will be without visitors and no single member will be without an arranged match.
Within the ultra-orthodox there are considerable differences between groups. For instance, the Lubavitch Hassidim are openly messianic and many believed their last leader to be at least a potential Messiah, while the Satmar dismiss any such possibility.
Most are hierarchical communities that seek the advice of their leader, either Rebbe or Rosh Yeshiva, on any decision, religious or secular. One line of defense was the expansion of yeshiva study, first among Lithuanians and later among Hassidim. The prototype was the Volzhin Yeshiva in Lithuania, established rivals" Silber (1992, p. 23) . 8 Menachem Friedman, quoted in Landau (1993), p. 255. 9 See, for example, Friedman (1991) , Heilman (1992) , Katz (1961) and Silber (1992) . As evidence, Heilman presents quotations from various ultra-orthodox leaders of the time. This view is also supported by the observation that ultra-orthodoxy did not develop among Jews from North Africa and the Arab world until faced with the option of assimilation into secular culture in Israel. 10 Katz (1961) , Ellenson (1992) and Silber (1992) make the same claim about orthodoxy.
German orthodoxy, and especially Hungarian orthodoxy, certainly had elements of increased segregation in them and increased stringency of religious prohibitions. Silber (1992) interprets early ultra-orthodoxy as an extreme offshoot of Hungarian orthodoxy.
in 1802 as a boarding school and supported by donations from outside the community.
Teenage boys were sent there to study the holy texts and commentaries in an effort to protect them from corrupting secular influences. 11 The study of religious law in yeshiva "became an absolute prerequisite for religious behavior throughout the traditionalist world" (Heilman, 1992, p. 20) . In contrast, secular studies beyond literacy and numeracy at a junior high school level are viewed as a necessary evil. The ultraorthodox have consistently attempted to resist attempts by governments to impose curricula of secular studies.
12
In hindsight, the community's agenda of preserving a traditional way of life has had tragic consequences. Unlike millions of East-European Jews, the ultra-orthodox rejected the option of emigration (mostly to America) in the early 20th century because America was considered too secular. Likewise, the ultra-orthodox declined to join the generally secular Zionist migration to Israel in the 1930s. As a consequence, more than any other segment of Judaism, the ultra-orthodox were trapped in Europe, to be nearly annihilated by the Nazis.
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, ultra-orthodox Jews established communities of survivors, with centers in New York, Jerusalem, Bnei Brak (in metropolitan Tel Aviv),
Amsterdam and London. These communities regard themselves as a pious elite, charged with the sacred duty of perpetuating the correct form of devotion by reestablishing their shattered East-European cultural tradition. Simon (1978) compares their view of other Jews to the view Black Muslims hold of other Afro-Americans: they pity those who lack the moral strength to preserve a sacred tradition against the forces of secular assimilation.
This fervent desire for cultural preservation was acknowledged by the first Israeli government, which agreed to exempt about 400 yeshiva students, many of them ref-
ugees from destroyed European yeshivot, from military service so that the study of the 11 Friedman (1991) p. 11. 12 The Volzhin yeshiva was eventually closed rather than ceding to a (Russian) government demand to include a secular curriculum (Heilman, 1992) .
Talmud could be nurtured (Friedman, 1991; Landau, 1993 Population increase is slightly faster in the measured period (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) than in the projection, despite a lower fertility rate, suggesting that migration and conversion made a net positive contribution to ultra-orthodox population growth, though the data do not allow a precise calculation. What is clear from the figure is that natural increase is the dominant force in ultra-orthodox population growth.
13 Ultra-orthodox families are identified in the Labor Force Survey (LFS) as families in which at least one male reports his last school attended as yeshiva. Fertility is calculated from LFS data by estimating births using the category "woman's own children aged 0-1" divided by two. In principle, this category may also contain adopted children, though the comparison with Population Registry birth figures in Table 1 indicates only a tiny discrepancy. 14 These estimates do not include ultra-orthodox living in boarding schools, which are not sampled in the LFS. They represented an additional 9,000 individuals in 1983, or an additional 5% of the population. a Total fertility is the sum of current age-specific fertility rates. It is the predicted number of lifetime births a woman would have if she experienced the current age-specific fertility rates over her lifetime. b Total fertility rates in Panel A are calculated from micro data using the Israel Labor Force Survey (LFS) question "own children aged 0-1 at home." These may include a small number of adopted children. Age-specific fertility rates are calculated for six age categories for women aged 18-54. Details are reported in Appendix Table A1 . LFS samples include all rotation groups in the first quarter of the year and only incoming rotations in the other four quarters. The full population total fertility rate in the LFS is less than that of the Population Registry due to undersampling of the Muslim population in the LFS. Heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors in parentheses. c Ultra-orthodox Jews are identified in the LFS as individuals living in a household in which at least one male declares the last school he attended as a yeshiva. a) Measured population is based on all individuals in families with at least one adult male who reports last school attended as yeshiva, in the LFS. b) Projected population ) is calculated by iteratively forecasting age and gender-specific cells using 1995/96 LFS averages as a base. Age-gender specific mortality rates are from the Population Registry, 1992. Age-specific fertility is predicted using a regression of births on women's age in the 1995/96 LFS. See Appendix for details. c) Upper and lower bounds for population projections are calculated using the upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals for predicted age-specific fertility rates to predict births. While this is likely to be the major component in variance of a projection, these bounds understate the true 95% confidence interval as they do not reflect: sampling variance in age-specific populations for women of childbearing age in the base year; projection variance in age-specific populations of women of childbearing age; variance in actual mortality; and variance in actual fertility. The most controversial of all points of contact between ultra-orthodox and secular society in Israel is draft deferments and exemptions, which are granted to full-time yeshiva students. Deferment of regular military service (three years) and reserve duty (about a month each year, usually until age 50) can be extended and eventually converted to an exemption by remaining in a yeshiva until age 41 (35 with five children) (Ilan, 1998c) . Restrictions on the maximum number of exemptions from required military service were lifted by the government in 1977. Since then, the number of deferments has increased to 3,000 per year, or 7.5% of males newly eligible for the draft. These deferments and exemptions are granted only to full time yeshiva students, who are liable to be drafted if they work even part time.
Increased subsidies to yeshiva students, combined with draft deferments and exemptions, have made yeshiva attendance increasingly attractive, even to older men. Figure 2 shows the increase in labor force nonparticipation due to yeshiva attendance.
The proportion of ultra-orthodox Jewish males (aged 25-54) not working because of full time yeshiva attendance is high and rising: from 41% in 1980 to 60% by 1996. 17
16 Ilan (1998b) estimates that an ultra-orthodox family with six children is eligible for NIS 6,500 ($1,850) per month in government support from all sources. 17 Yeshiva attendance may be somewhat (but not grossly) exaggerated. A government commission reported on cases in which a yeshiva student was investigated on suspicion of violating the deferment agreement: 40% of these were found to be in violation, either by working or by being in a different yeshiva. The army claims that the figure is 20% (Ilan, 1998c) . The violation rate in a random sample of yeshiva students would presumably be lower.
These levels are unprecedented among Jews, 18 and far exceed the levels of yeshiva attendance of the ultra-orthodox abroad, where young men are rarely in yeshiva past the age of 25. The combination of increased yeshiva attendance and rapid population growth have resulted in a sharp increase in the number of ultra-orthodox children whose father does not work because he is in yeshiva. The figure reports that the proportion of Israeli children with a (labor force nonparticipant) father in yeshiva more than doubled between 1980 and 1996, from 2.7% to 5.9%. Notes: a) Men are classified as full time yeshiva students if they are labor force nonparticipants, report their reason for nonparticipation as studies, and report their current school attended as yeshiva. The ultra-orthodox nonparticipation rate is higher. Between 90 and 99% of ultra-orthodox nonparticipants list studies as their reason for nonparticipation. b) Children are classified as "Father in yeshiva" if they reside in a household whose head or head's spouse is a full time yeshiva student. Source: LFS micro data. See Appendix for details of the weighting procedure.
18 Friedman (1991) describes the history of yeshiva attendance in Europe.
Families with fathers in a yeshiva have very low incomes. Table 3 reports income by source for households with a father (aged 25-54) in a yeshiva in the mid-1990s. The average family in this category is large -4.5 children at home. Their monthly income in 1995 averaged about US$1,150 or NIS3,463, only 42% of the income of the average two-parent Israeli family (which has 2.1 children). 19 Measured income does not include imputed rent for a population that generally owns its own housing. It is worth stressing, though, that the common practice of conditioning marriage on the provision of an apartment by parents exists precisely because young ultra-orthodox couples cannot afford to pay rent. The penultimate line in panel A reports that the Israeli poverty line in 1995 for a household with 6.6 members was NIS 3,777.
Thus, the average family with a prime-aged father in yeshiva is in poverty. 20 Families with fathers in yeshiva are extremely dependent on government support.
Only 18% of family income is earned, almost entirely from the wife's earnings.
Transfers from institutions (other than the National Insurance Institute) account for 39% of income, primarily stipends granted to yeshiva attendants. Child allowances make up another 32% of income. These transfers, mostly from the government, account for at least 70% of these families' income, and do not include pensions, disability and other National Insurance benefits. In short, the combination of increased yeshiva attendance and natural population increase has created a rapid increase in the absolute number and proportion of ultra-orthodox families dependent on government support to maintain even very modest living standards. In order to maintain this standard of living at current levels of yeshiva attendance and ultra-orthodox fertility, outside support of the community would have to continue to increase at 4-5% annually, or double each 16-18 years, a growth rate much higher than Israel's rate of per capita output growth.
19 Under-reporting of income would bias the estimates downwards. Yeshiva nonparticipants may be more likely to under-report income since, in principle, they face harsher potential penalties than do most taxpayers: they could lose both their stipends and draft deferments as well as having to pay taxes. In practice there is evidence that these sanctions are not strictly enforced (Ilan, 1998d) . 20 The poverty line is meant to be compared with income net of income taxes, which would be even lower than the reported figure. a "Other sources" include income from pensions, transfers from abroad, social insurance programs and self-employment income. b Residual is the difference between gross income and income from all reported sources.
Source: Microdata from the CBS, Israel Income Survey, which excludes the self-employed (3.4% of ultra-orthodox prime aged males were self-employed in LFS 1993-96). Children and household members are calculated from the LFS. The poverty line in 1995 was NIS 830 per month × number of standard adults per household as calculated by the National Insurance Institute formula.
At current levels of transfers and taxes the ultra-orthodox population growth rate will make Israel's welfare system insolvent and bankrupt municipalities with large ultra-orthodox populations. 21 The status quo is not sustainable without transferring an increased proportion of output to welfare programs. This condition cannot be quickly reversed by current yeshiva students entering the work force. Yeshiva students face low wages. Table 4 reports estimates of a standard human capital wage regression in 1979-82 and 1993-96. The second column in each panel reports separate coefficients measuring the (market) return to schooling for secular and yeshiva education. While the return to secular schooling rose in Israel in the 1980s and early 1990s, from 7.8 to 9.4 percent, the return to yeshiva education was low and possibly decreasing, from 2.3 to 1.8 percent. Relative to secular education, which is a remarkably good human capital investment in Israel, yeshiva schooling has become an increasingly poor investment. 22 Yet ultra-orthodox men are choosing it in growing numbers and for longer durations of study.
Based on an earlier version of these findings, Berman and Klinov (1997) recommended a change in Israel's draft deferment rules for yeshiva study, arguing that the deferment be decoupled from the requirement not to work, either by giving an unconditional exemption to ultra-orthodox Jews or by abolishing the exemption altogether.
That position was based on the logic that high yeshiva enrollment rates were due to the requirements of the draft deferment rules, which tax the first hour of work for a yeshiva student with months (if not years) of military service.
21 Dahan (1997) analyzes the effect of ultra-orthodox demographics and earnings on Jerusalem's municipal finances. 22 The standard caveat about the causal interpretation of regression coefficients is in order.
For example, if years of schooling in yeshiva are positively correlated with an unobserved variable such as preference for work that allows study during work hours, low wages may represent a compensating differential and bias the estimated coefficient downward. It seems unlikely that the entire gap between the returns to secular and yeshiva education can be due to such biases. 1979 -1982 142 individuals report yeshiva as last school attended). Includes prime-aged males who reported at least one hour worked in the previous week, were not recent immigrants, and reported years of schooling. Hourly wage is measured in 1995 NIS.
c Experience was calculated as (age -education -6) for yeshiva graduates and non-Jews and as (age -experience -9) for Jews. To the extent that yeshiva graduates and non-Jews serve in the military, their labor market experience will be overestimated.
Source: Microdata from CBS, Israel Income Survey. The self-employed are excluded from the microdata. Panel A: See Table A2 for descriptive statistics and Table A3 for a full set of coefficients. Panel B: Variable means are reported in Table A2 . This paper challenges our previous logic, mostly because of the following puzzle. If a father's yeshiva attendance is being extended in order to qualify for a draft exemption, we would expect that as soon as the exemption is granted such a father would choose to leave the yeshiva for the labor force, either to work or to seek work. Exemptions are achieved at age 35 for men with at least five children and at age 41 regardless of the number of children. These critical ages are marked with vertical lines in Figure 3 , which plots labor-force nonparticipation due to yeshiva attendance against age. Not only does yeshiva attendance not disappear at age 41, there is no sharp decline of yeshiva attendance rates at either age. Table 5 reports that in the early 1990s fully 46% of ultraorthodox men aged 41-45 chose yeshiva rather than the labor market despite being exempt from military service for life.
The choice of studies over work is especially puzzling considering the high marginal utility of income in large families. 23 At age 35 a yeshiva student could earn more than twice his monthly stipend by working. That ratio would rise to about 250% by age 45, with 10 years' labor-market experience. A 25 year old yeshiva student could earn twice the stipend by working, would incur perhaps a month a year of reserve duty till his exemption (generally at age 35), and would gain returns to experience which would increase his future earnings. 23 Households headed by yeshiva attendants aged 41-45 average 6.4 children at home.
Average income for households headed by yeshiva attendants aged 41-45 is NIS4,536 per month (at 1995 prices) as compared to a poverty line of NIS5,196 (1993-96 Note: Men are classified as full-time yeshiva students if they are labor force nonparticipants, report their reason for nonparticipation as studies, and report their current school attended as yeshiva. The ultra-orthodox nonparticipation rate is higher. Between 90 and 99% of ultraorthodox nonparticipants list studies as their reason for nonparticipation. Compounding the puzzle is the fact that, beginning in their late thirties, a typical ultra-orthodox couple's children will be marrying. That rarely occurs without the parents' guaranteeing minimal financial security by purchasing an apartment for the young couple, since the groom will certainly be in yeshiva and the young couple will be too poor to pay rent.
Could extended yeshiva attendance be out of sheer love of learning? That explanation is inconsistent with the fact that in much wealthier communities abroad, often followers of the same Rebbe, men seldom attend yeshiva past their mid-twenties. In the Montreal hassidic community, for example, only 6% of men aged 25 or older attend yeshiva full time (Shahar, Weinfeld and Schnoor, 1997) .
In summary, a conventional model of labor supply cannot explain the phenomenon of yeshiva attendance after the benefits of the draft deferment subsidy have been exhausted (unless the marginal utility of income is unreasonably low). This empirical failure motivates us to turn to an alternative model drawn from the Economics of Religion in the following section. We then examine its implications for a welfare analysis of policy.
III. Efficient Prohibitions and Sacrifices
This section presents a model of efficient prohibitions and sacrifices capable of explaining the puzzle of extended full-time yeshiva attendance as the interaction of a sacrifice, which is an efficient form of signaling, with a subsidy that induces a larger signal.
Prohibitions and sacrifices are common among religious groups. Prohibitions refer to forbidden behaviors, such as dietary restrictions, Sabbath observance, dress codes, head shaving, marital fidelity and other restrictions on sexual behavior, or refusal of certain medical care. Sacrifices, in contrast, involve donation or destruction of resources. Historically, clear examples are circumcision (which was surely a traumatic event in an era of high child mortality) and burnt offerings. Currently, a vow of fidelity or abstinence is a form of sacrifice, since it represents a permanent restriction of activities. Charity could also interpreted as a sacrifice, either in money, in kind, or in donated labor (such as the years of volunteer activity required of Mormons). A subtler form of sacrifice is the alternative cost of time spent in labor-intensive religious activities rather than in human capital accumulation. Limiting choices and destroying or relinquishing resources is puzzling to an economist, yet people voluntarily join groups that enforce prohibitions and require sacrifices. Iannaccone (1992) offers an original explanation for these phenomena. I present it here in simplified form and then extend his model to the case of subsidized sacrifices.
Religion is a 'club good': Club members derive utility from time spent in religious activities, R, and from secular goods, S. They also gain utility from group 'quality', the average amount of time that other members spend doing R, which is an externality for the other members. N is exogenous, for now. For example, praying is much more satisfying the more participants there are, especially when the 10th man arrives to make up a prayer quorum (minyan). The same is true of studying, observing the Sabbath and other time-intensive activities. 24 They are much more enjoyable if the neighbors do them as well.
Perhaps the most important source of externalities to religious activity in the ultraorthodox community is the role of charity in providing mutual insurance. Anecdotally, we observe remarkable altruism in donations of time and money to community charities that provide insurance to community members in the form of job search, spouse search, 24 On the time intensity of Jewish religious observances see Chiswick (1995 Members maximize utility subject to time and budget constraints. Time is split between the religious activity, R, and work hours, H,
Income is earned at wage rate w and entirely spent on consumption of the secular good S, at price p,
These imply a full income budget constraint: wT = pS i + wR i .
The social welfare maximum is achieved at R = R* for all individuals,
The terms on the right hand side of the equation are, respectively, the marginal rate of substitution of religious for secular goods, and of group quality for secular goods. 25 Income inequality in Israel is found to be second only to that in the U.S. in a recent study by Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) .
Optimal choice of R by individuals in a competitive equilibrium will ignore the external benefits of R and will thus spend a sub-optimal amount of time on religious activity. In the competitive Nash equilibrium individuals all choose the same level of R.
Assume that we are in the (usual) range of w/p where labor supply is upward sloping. Thus, R decreases in w/p, so that
Religious activity is then underprovided in a competitive equilibrium, as illustrated in Figure 4 .
Efficient Prohibition
The welfare of group members can be improved by increasing the average level of activity, R, either by subsidizing R or by taxing its substitute, S. Religious groups often encourage R with eternal promises and the respect of one's peers. Yet R may be hard to subsidize if it is unobservable, like anonymous charity or the Sabbath observance of the neighbors' son. Alternatively, a club could impose club-enforced prohibitions on types of secular goods consumption, thereby inducing members to work less and spend more time in religious activities. Religious restrictions can be understood as extreme but enforceable forms of taxation on secular goods, which can make all club members better off.
Activities involving contact with the secular world substitute for group activities; thus,
prohibitions that limit such contacts induce members to spend more time in religious and other group activities, which has positive externalities.
This logic provides a rationale for many forms of religious prohibition. For example, Sabbath restrictions induce members to spend time together in prayer on the Sabbath; dietary restrictions decrease the ability of group members to socialize with nonmembers; and so forth. Note that this also explains the use of dress codes, which aid enforcement by making community members readily identifiable. As in the military, there are sanctions for being caught out of uniform.
Groups that place many restrictions on secular activities are often termed 'sects' by sociologists (Weber, 1946) . Adam Smith (1776), in his chapter on Church and State, uses similar terminology and proposes that secular "gaiety" be subsidized in order to undermine the influence of sects that propound "disagreeably strict" moral codes. Smith might just as well have been describing the birth of ultra-orthodoxy at the end of the 18th century, as described by Friedman and Heilman above, in its imposition of restrictions as a reaction to emancipation.
To interpret this process in the context of the present model, consider the case where the community can literally control the price level faced by members through a tax. To achieve the (club's) social welfare optimum they would choose p*, where
The equation implies that in response to an exogenous increase in wages, prices will (be manipulated to) increase in proportion, leaving the real wage constant. Or, less literally, the community will respond to an increase in real wages with a countervailing increase in prohibitions. That would be the birth of ultra-orthodoxy.
At more stringent levels of prohibition, members have the option of 'voting with their feet' (assimilating), or joining a less stringent club (with a lower level of externalities or 'social cohesion'). Heterogeneity in wages would yield a spectrum of religious practice (I return to issues of heterogeneity in the discussion below). It is important to note that the prediction of this model, that wage opportunities are intrinsically lower for the more observant, is only true in this simple version of the model. More generally (as in Iannaccone, 1992) , all that is necessary is that the observant have a greater preference for religious activity over consumption at the margin.
In the modern Israeli context, the model predicts that a club will lobby the government to adopt the appropriate subsidy or tax. For example, the ultra-orthodox in The induced friction between club members and nonmembers resulting from a political agenda, for instance, may cause antagonism towards club members. An interesting aspect of this model is that secular antagonism toward the ultra-orthodox could be desirable and efficient from the point of view of the latter community if it discourages secular activity by club members, since it provides another mechanism by which higher levels of religious activity are induced by taxing secular activity. In that sense this is a theory of efficient intolerance. Efficient mutual antagonism between two clubs is an immediate extension.
Efficient Sacrifice
Sacrifices like circumcision, burnt offerings, or charity cannot be explained as efficient prohibitions using the logic above, since they do not tax a secular good. They can be explained as a sort of initiation rite that signals unobserved type, as in Camerer (1988) . I introduce heterogeneity by having low wage (type 1) and high wage (type 2) individuals. High wage individuals will choose less religious activity as it is relatively more expensive for them, i.e., R 2 < R 1 . (Heterogeneity could, alternatively, be in preference for religious activities at the margin; heterogeneity in wages is chosen only to simplify the exposition.)
High wage -low R individuals would like to join the high R group and benefit from their high average level of religious activity, Q 1 = R 1 . Members of the high R group would rather not admit the high wage types, as the reduction in the average level of religious activity (observance) to Access to the externality is excludable, so the high R (low wage) group can solve this free-rider problem by organizing a club with a costly initiation rite, or sacrifice, which will successfully exclude low R (high wage) individuals from joining, keeping Q 1 at its previous level. Note that even if type is unobservable, a well-designed initiation rite will force people to signal their type by their willingness to sacrifice time. The time constraint, T, is now
where K ∈ (0, κ) is a voluntary sacrifice. Individuals who choose K = κ can join the high R club and enjoy Q 1 .
An efficient sacrifice will have to be small enough ensure that low-wage types will always prefer to make the sacrifice and remain in their own high R group. Expressed in an indirect utility function that condition is
It must also be large enough that high-wage types will always prefer not to sacrifice and remain in their low R group,
With enough type 2 (high wage) people, a κ will exist that separates the types into low and high R groups as long as for a given Q, R 2 (.., Q) < R 1 (.., Q), and type 2 people have a lower shadow price of Q than do type 1 people (Iannaccone, 1992, Proposition 2). The optimal κ imposes the smallest cost on the low wage -high R group, while providing separation. The smallest possible κ that keeps low R people out of the high R group is κ* such that 26 Figure 5 illustrates the imposition of an optimal sacrifice and the resulting increase in utility for the low-wage group. 27 The horizontal axis shows the allocation of time between work hours, religious activity and sacrifice. The vertical axis measures utility.
The two higher curves represent the utility of high-wage types and the two lower curves the utility of low-wage types. High-wage types in a low Q(Q 2 ) environment will optimally choose point A2. Low-wage types in a low Q(Q 2 ) environment will choose A1 at a higher level of R than high-wage types. Low-wage types can improve their outcome by establishing a club with an admission restriction K. By excluding highwage types they can achieve a higher level of utility at B1, where the sacrifice of time, K, is more than compensated for by the higher level of Q(Q 1 ). Any sacrifice that induces low-wage types to sacrifice and high-wage types not to sacrifice is a separating equilibrium. The efficient sacrifice is the smallest K that induces separation, leaving the high-wage types indifferent between high Q and a sacrifice (at B2), and low Q without a sacrifice (at A2).
Thus, the low wage -high R group is better off with the institution of a sacrifice and will accept anyone who makes the sacrifice, since they know that the sacrifice is a 26 We assume throughout that high-wage types choose not to join when indifferent. The alternative is to clutter the notation with a small positive ε added to the required sacrifice. 27 Figures 5 and 6 are constructed by simulation using the utility function U(S, R, Q) =
signal of a high level of religious activity. This setup is analogous to other forms of costly sacrifices which signal type, such as initiation rites in the military, hazing in fraternities, Spence signaling in schooling, or frivolous engagement rings in Camerer's gift-giving model (1988). 
Subsidy and Sacrifice
The previous section on prohibition mentioned that a government subsidy of R could be efficient. In contrast, a subsidy to the club is largely wasted as it induces a larger 
For a subsidy θ> 0 this condition becomes
That is, any subsidy θ induces a countervailing increase in the optimal sacrifice of ∆κ, a tax on group members that represents a huge distortion in labor supply. It destroys exactly the value of the subsidy in terms of the utility of high-wage individuals.
The net effect on the utility of low-wage individuals is indeterminate. In a general model it is entirely possible that potential entrants value the subsidy more than do current club members, so that the subsidy can actually leave club members worse off. Figure 6 illustrates the distortion in a subsidized sacrifice. The unsubsidized separating equilibrium is described by points A2 and B1 (as in Figure 5 ). A subsidy enhances the utility of club membership, which would shift point B2 vertically upwards and destroy the separating equilibrium if K is unchanged. To protect the club from low R free riders the optimal sacrifice κ* must be increased to κ*′ = κ* + ∆κ in order to keep these high-wage types from joining. κ*′ is such that the high-wage types are indifferent between joining (at C2) and not joining (at A2). In the example, club members gain a net benefit from the subsidy as their utility is higher at the new optimal choice (C1) than it was at the old one (B1). Club members could also be made worse off by the subsidy, if they value it less than the potential entrant does, so that the utility loss due to increased sacrifice outweighs the gain due to increased subsidy. In any case, the subsidy reduces work for low-wage types but has no effect on high-wage types.
This modest insight is an innovation on Iannaccone (1992) . Literally, this subsidy is in income, and many forms of subsidy to the ultra-orthodox community take this form.
More generally, the subsidy could come in the form of exemptions from military service, which can be interpreted as a transfer of time to the ultra-orthodox which they would have otherwise had to spend in the military. It is possible to show that in the case of a subsidy in the form of time, the net value of that subsidy to club members is zero, as it is entirely dissipated in increased sacrifice. Could yeshiva attendance have an element of sacrifice in it? It is a time-intensive activity, practiced by individuals with very low alternative labor market opportunities.
That is the efficient way to separate high-from low-wage types. I claim that yeshiva attendance could constitute a signal of commitment to the ultra-orthodox community.
Draft deferments and exemptions for the ultra-orthodox are given according to the following rules: Healthy males are subject to a draft for three years of military service beginning at age 18. As part of the current agreement between the Israeli government and the ultra-orthodox, full-time yeshiva students receive a deferment of regular military service, which becomes an exemption at age 25. If they stay in yeshiva till age 35 and have five children, they are exempt from reserve duty too (30-40 days a year in the 1980s). At age 41 they are exempt from reserve duty regardless of the number of children.
The draft deferral that subsidizes yeshiva attendance compromises its value as a signal of commitment, inducing more years of yeshiva attendance in order to gain the same signaling value. This could explain the puzzle that motivated this section, the fact that many men remain in yeshiva even after they are exempt from military service.
Could that be out of sheer love of learning? Recall that this explanation is inconsistent with the fact that ultra-orthodox men in communities abroad seldom stay in yeshiva past their mid twenties. The logic of the model allows utility from learning, which is omitted only for clarity. Note that the greater the utility derived (for all types) from yeshiva attendance, the longer the duration needed to provide the required signal of commitment, which necessarily involves a sacrifice of utility.
The comparison with communities abroad also rules out the possibility that yeshiva attendance of men in their forties is due to a combination of high income from other subsidies and a high income elasticity of demand for learning, since the communities outside Israel have higher income. I conclude that the Israel-abroad difference is due to the combination of subsidy and signal. Abroad, in the absence of a subsidy, a few years in yeshiva are a sufficient sacrifice of time to signal commitment to the ultra-orthodox community. In Israel the subsidies to ultra-orthodoxy, chief among which is the draft deferment, require a larger sacrifice to signal the same degree of commitment. That is consistent with the facts since 1977: as subsidies to the ultra-orthodox have increased per capita, 28 the duration of yeshiva attendance has increased as well. 29 More generally, any action that makes nonmembership less attractive relative to membership will also induce an inefficient increase in sacrifice. Thus use of the law to 28 See Berman-Klinov (1997) for a discussion. 29 Another possible cause of increased optimal sacrifice is the decreased stigma attached to avoidance of military service outside the ultra-orthodox community, which would also make club membership more attractive. 
IV. Policy Implications and Conclusions
In Section III I argued that the current structure of subsidies to the ultra-orthodox community is inherently wasteful. Generous subsidies through draft exemptions and transfers are dissipated by large sacrifices of resources through widespread yeshiva study expanding into older and older age groups. Section II indicated that the community is headed for economic impoverishment. It is worth stressing that approximately 100,000 children live in households headed by a yeshiva-attending father; the average income of these households is very low, below the Israeli poverty line. How then to transfer funds to these families, which support many children, without inducing a canceling increase in the duration of yeshiva attendance, which destroys earnings and human capital as a sacrifice?
In previous work (Berman and Klinov, 1997) we argued that draft deferments conditioned on yeshiva attendance are an obstacle to the self-sufficiency of the ultraorthodox community as they provide strong disincentives to earning and human capital accumulation. The conditioning of draft deferment and of stipends on not working is an enormous tax on the first hour of work. The same is true of the requirement that men over the age of 30 must have studied full time in yeshiva continuously in the past in 30 This is essentially an argument against state law favoring any religious group. It is related to Iannaccone's (1997) more general point, that competition between religious groups reduces their ability to be prohibitive and intolerant. The question dates back to Smith's debate with Hume over the welfare effects of state-supported religions. "In essence [Hume] argues that religious laissez-faire generates powerful negative externalities, as religious suppliers promote superstition and hostility toward the members of all competing religions, leading ultimately to civil strife and political instability..." (Iannaccone, 1997, p. 112) . Smith argues that free entry will induce competition, which will force entrants and incumbents to be tolerant of each other. The absence of religious strife in America, with its separation of Church and State, is interpreted order to qualify for stipends and deferments. That continuous study requirement discourages yeshiva students from even experimenting with work or from working temporarily to provide for their families in a crisis. Furthermore, the conditioning of deferment and stipends on full-time study in yeshiva leaves little time for secular, workoriented studies.
The above argument is incomplete, as it misses the main point of the efficient signaling model of Section III: Any subsidy that increases the return to joining for a nonmember will be canceled and wasted by a counteracting increase in the optimal sacrifice. In order to be efficient a subsidy must be equitable, in the sense that it improves the utility of nonmembers just as much as it improves the utility that they would get by joining.
In this case equity and efficiency dictate the same policy. Equation (10) makes it clear that transfers to the ultra-orthodox that do not discriminate between members and potential entrants will not induce an offsetting sacrifice. In this context an equitably applied subsidy (such as job training conditioned only on employment status, or the child allowance system, which is conditioned only on the number of children) is much more efficient than subsidies such as stipends or support of ultra-orthodox schools, which are conditioned on membership in the ultra-orthodox community or on yeshiva attendance.
Applied to the subsidy implicit in draft deferments, this logic has a clear implication:
Easing the conditions of exemption from military duty (such as the reduced yeshiva attendance requirements proposed in September 1997 by the Finance Ministry), would merely increase the already inequitable subsidy to the ultra-orthodox. That implies an increase in the compensating sacrifice, probably not in the form of increased yeshiva attendance but in some other -inherently inefficient -form. Universal equitable application of the draft would avoid such a distortion. 31 The model predicts that the as evidence in favor of Smith. 31 A third option, which also has the advantage of efficiency through equitable treatment, is a volunteer military. That is a complex question, which is not currently under consideration. In short, it has the usual advantages of efficient allocation through market wages but the dis-welfare loss to the ultra-orthodox community from equitable application of the draft would be small (literally zero). They could be efficiently compensated with a general increase in other forms of income support (child allowances or job training) equitably applied to all needy Israelis. Such a policy reform would benefit a large population of low-income children. It would also promote tolerance, reducing the incentive of the ultra-orthodox to put themselves in conflict with Jews of other traditions by reducing their need to exclude free riders through costly sacrifice.
The perceived inequity of the draft deferral arrangement has been a traditional divisive force in Israeli public life. The secular and mainstream religious population (including some non-Jews, such as Bedouin and Druze) generally regard military service as a necessary public service, some of which is quite dangerous, and resent the ultra-orthodox exemption. In contrast to that debate over equity per se, the inequity in the draft deferment system creates an inefficiency, which has been instrumental in driving the ultra-orthodox community toward economic crisis.
Rapid population growth combined with low human capital accumulation imply threats to the economic viability of the Israeli ultra-orthodox community both in the long term and in the short term. In the long term, transfers from parents will necessarily be exhausted. It is also hard to imagine government support or donations from abroad doubling every 16-18 years. In the shorter term, the dependency of the ultra-orthodox on donations makes them vulnerable to two types of risk. First, a recession abroad may severely reduce donations (a large proportion of those transfers come from diamond and real estate wealth, two highly cyclical industries). Secondly, a realignment in Israeli politics may bring to power a center-left of center-right coalition with a majority that does not depend on ultra-orthodox support. Such a coalition could exploit secular resentment of ultra-orthodox political success by promising to reduce transfers to the ultra-orthodox. Reform of the draft deferral regulations would help insulate the community against both risks.
advantages of the necessity to raise revenue to pay higher salaries through distortionary taxation and the loss of the draft's current function of promoting cultural cohesion and promoting an equitable distribution of the special tax of military service.
In describing a phenomenon as central to economics as labor supply we have seen that the predictions of a conventional labor supply model are refuted when the population examined is ultra-orthodox Jews. The club good approach, which was designed to explain puzzles in religious behavior, succeeds in explaining labor supply as well. Is this merely an intriguing result, like potatoes as a Giffen good, particular to a specific group in an unusual historic setting? I think not. Particularly intriguing is the connection of fundamentalism to fertility. Much of the strength of fundamentalist movements is derived from their increasing population shares, not only in Israel but throughout the Muslim world as well. An economic explanation for fertility transition is that increased wages of women lower fertility rates.
Can a 'fundamentalist' group forestall demographic transition indefinitely by using prohibitions to tax real wages? Can it actually increase fertility with a combination of 32 Weber (1946) traces high levels of mutual support among U.S. Protestant 'sects' such as
Baptists and Quakers to those communities' historical roots in 17th-century Europe. 33 See, for example, the description of Mawdudi's orthodox fundamentalism in India in Aziz (1967, pp. 208-213) ; the description of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Islamic world in Dekmejian (1995, p. 19 ) and in Faksh (1997, pp. 8-10) .
prohibitions and transfers, using both substitution and income effects? Past and future changes in Israeli welfare policy provide an excellent environment in which to study these questions.
Appendix: Demographic Calculations
Ultra-orthodox families are identified in this study as all families in which at least one male reports his last school attended as a yeshiva. This classification implies ultraorthodox, as opposed to a 'Modern Orthodox' yeshiva, which is a separate educational stream.
The fertility calculations in Table 1, Table 2 , and Figure 1 count births using the Israel Labor Force Survey (LFS) question "own children aged 0-1 at home." These may include a small number of adopted children, though the comparison with fertility rates for Jewish women as recorded in the Population Registry (Table 1) indicates only tiny discrepancies. Age-specific fertility rates are reported in Figure A1 for the ultraorthodox and for the full population.
The total fertility rates in Table 1 are calculated using six age-specific fertility rates for women aged 18 through 54. These fertility rates are reported in panel A of Table A1 , which indicates that the increase in fertility among ultra-orthodox women occurred mostly for women over thirty.
The LFS has a rotating panel of families. They are sampled for two adjacent quarters, left out for two quarters, and then resampled for two quarters. Our samples include all rotation groups in the first quarter of the year and only incoming rotations in the other four quarters. When years are combined to generate a sample, all rotation groups are included in the first quarter of the first year and only incoming rotations are included in subsequent quarters.
The demographic projections in Figure 1 and Table 2 are calculated using agespecific predicted fertility rates and mortality rates. Predicted fertility rates are calculated using the estimated coefficients in Upper and lower bounds for population projections are calculated using the upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals for predicted age-specific fertility rates to predict births. While this is likely to be the major component in variance of a projection, these bounds are smaller than the true 95% confidence interval for population as they do not reflect: (i) sampling variance in age-specific populations for women of childbearing age in the base year; (ii) projection variance in age-specific populations of women of childbearing age; (iii) variance in actual mortality; and (iv) variance in actual fertility.
Measured population is based on all individuals in families. The LFS provide sampling weights only for adults (aged 15 and over since 1986 or 14 and over previously). Children are weighted using their mother's sampling weights when available, and that of the head of household when mother's sampling weight is not available for all children in the household. The same method is used to estimate age-gender specific cells in the 1995/96 basis for the population projection. Figure 1 and question "own children aged 0-1 at home." These may include a small number of adopted children b Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
c Ultra-orthodox Jews are identified in the survey as individuals living in a household in which at least one male declares his last school attended as yeshiva. Source: Israel LFS. LFS samples include all rotation groups in the first quarter of the year and only incoming rotations in the other four quarters. c Experience calculated as (age -education -6) for yeshiva graduates and non-Jews, and as (age -experience -9) for Jews. To the extent that yeshiva graduates and non-Jews serve in the military, their labor market experience will be overestimated. d 168 prime aged males report yeshiva as last school attended in the 1993-1996 sample. 142 report yeshiva as last school attended in 1979-1982. Source: Micro data, Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel Income Surveys, 1979 -1982 , 1993 -1996 . Includes prime-aged males who reported at least one hour worked in the previous week, were not recent immigrants, and reported years of schooling. 
